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Privacy Act Expungements: 
A Reconsideration 
James Gregory Bradsher 
"Privacy," according to Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court William 0. Douglas, "involves the choice of 
the individual to disclose or to reveal what he believes, what 
he thinks, what he possesses. The individual," he believed, 
"should have the freedom to select for himself the time and 
circumstances when he will share his secrets with others and 
decide the extent of that sharing."1 For the private 
manuscript repository the protection of an individual's right 
to privacy, at least that of the donor, presents no 
insurmountable problems. Donors may simply purge files in 
advance of deposit or place certain restrictions on their 
disclosure. 
1 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U .S. 323 (1966). 
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More vexing is the problem of government records 
which contain information that either should not have been 
collected in the first place, or that is incorrect. Unfortu-
nately, many government files contain inaccurate informa-
tion and, infrequently, illegally obtained information. With 
respect to such federal--not archival--records, individuals 
can generally have the records amended, or have them 
expunged, that is, destroyed. Daily, federal records or 
portions of them, are destroyed based on the belief that the 
right of privacy is more important than the right of 
contemporary society as well as posterity to know. 
Archivists are aware of the problems of protecting 
privacy versus the desire of researchers to have access to 
records--the right to privacy vs. the right to know.2 But 
what archivists are most likely not aware of is that records 
including those scheduled as archival are expunged. What 
follows is an analysis of the federal expungement process in 
the context of one specific expungement case. This analysis 
2 Walter Rundell, Jr. and Bruce F. Adams, "Historians, 
Archivists, and the Privacy Issue," Georgia Archive 3 (Winter 
1975): 3-15; Alan Reitman, "Freedom of Information and 
Privacy: The Civil Libertarian's Dilemma," American 
Archivist, 38 (October 1975): 501-508; James Gregory 
Bradsher, "Researchers, Archivists and the Access Challenge 
of the FBI Records in the National Archives," Midwestern 
Archivist 11 (1986): 95-110; Philip P. Mason, "The 
Archivist's Responsibility to Researchers and Donors: A 
Delicate Balance," in Alonzo L. Hamby and Edward Weldon, 
eds., Access to the Papers of Recent Public Figures: The 
New Harmony Conference (Bloomington, Indiana: Organiza-
tion of American Historians for the American Historical 
Association-Organization of American Historians-Society of 
American Archivists Committee on Historians and 
Archivists, 1977), 25-37; Barton J. Bernstein, "A Plea for 
Opening the Door," ibid., 83-90. Norman A. Graebner, 
"History, Society, and the Right to Privacy," in Rockefeller 
Archive Center, The Scholar's Right to Know Versus the 
Individual's Right to Privacy. Proceedings of the First 
Archive Center Conference, December 5, 1975 (n.p.: Rocke-
feller Archives Center, n.d.), 20-24. 
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is provided for four reasons: first, to acquaint readers with 
the right to know, the right to privacy, and their relationship 
to the expungement process; second, to help them decide if 
expungements of permanently scheduled records are some-
thing they can accept; third, to explain why the current law 
and procedures governing expungements should be changed; 
and fourth, to suggest changes in the manner in which 
expungements are handled. 
Among the major American democratic principles is the 
right of the people to be informed and have the ability to be 
informed. Indeed, the right to know is important to the 
United States' political system. The Supreme Court and its 
justices have continually expressed the importance of free 
and open discussion. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes 
stated that "it is only through free debate and free exchange 
of ideas that government remains responsive to the people."3 
Justice Douglas wrote that "the vitality of civil and political 
institutions in our society depends on free discussion" and 
that "full and free discussion has indeed been the first article 
of our faith. We have founded our political system on it."4 
Just as the right to know is important, so too is the 
importance of using records as a means of studying the past, 
especially the recent past. In order to know, in order to 
conduct an analysis of government activities and judgments 
and to influence the correction of government mistakes and 
abuses, researchers must have access to information. If 
information is withheld, it cannot be acted upon. The 
Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is based on this 
premise. 
"The basic purpose of [the] FOIA," according to the 
Supreme Court, "is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to 
3 De Jonge v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 353 (1937). 
4 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. l (1949) and Dennis v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (l.951). 
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the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check 
against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to 
the governed."5 
While achieving an informed citizenry is a crucial goal, 
counterpoised to it are other vital societal aims, including the 
protection of personal privacy rights. Indeed, one of the 
most important rights of Americans is that of privacy, 
defined by Justice Louis D. Brandeis as the right "to be let 
alone."6 This right according to Justice Douglas, "is indeed 
the beginning of all freedom."7 Neither the Constitution nor 
the Bill of Rights nor any amendments explicitly mention 
any right to privacy. However, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of 
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the 
Constitution.a In 1961, the Supr~me Court stated the right 
to privacy must be considered a basic constitutional right "no 
less important than any other right carefully and particularly 
reserved to the people."9 ''This notion of privacy," Justice 
Douglas observed, "is not drawn from the blue. It emanates 
from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which 
we live."10 The Supreme Court has recognized that a right 
of privacy is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's 
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections from govern-
5 National Labor Relations Board v. Robbins Tire & 
Rubber Co. , 437 U.S. 242 (1978). 
6 Olmstead v. United States , 277 U.S. 478 (1928). 
7 Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 467 
(l 952). 
8 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
9 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 656 (1961). 
10 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961). 
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mental invasions of the sanctity of an individual's home and 
the privacies of life, and the Ninth Amendment's protection 
of rights, though not enumerated, retained by the people.n 
But the right to privacy is not absolute. Justice Brandeis 
also stated that "every unjustifiable intrusion by the 
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever 
the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment."12 The key to this sentence is the word 
"unjustifiable."13 Under the Fourth Amendment, privacy is 
protected only against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The Fourth Amendment, Justice Potter Stewart stated, in 
delivering the opinion of the court, "cannot be translated 
into a general constitutional 'right of privacy.' That 
Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds 
of government intrusion. Other provisions of the Constitu-
tion," he wrote, "protect personal privacy from other forms 
of government invasion. But the protection of a person's 
'general' right to privacy .. .is, like the protection of his 
property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the 
individual states."14 Because the right of privacy is not out 
H Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 630 (1886); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 
(1961); Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
12 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U .S. 438 (1928). 
13 Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 605 (1946). 
14 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 350, 351 (1967). "I 
like my privacy as well as the next one," Justice Hugo L. 
Black stated in his dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut, "but I 
am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has the 
right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific 
constitutional provisions." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
510 (1965). He opined that there is not a constitutional right 
to privacy, believing it was not found in the due process 
clause or the Ninth Amendment, nor "any mysterious and 
uncertain natural law concept." Also dissenting in the same 
case, Justice Potter Stewart stated that "I can find no such 
general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other 
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of reach of the legislative power, the details of the right of 
privacy, and even its very existence, are matters of 
legislative control. As Justice Douglas stated in 1952, "There 
is room for regulation of the ways and means of invading 
privacy ."15 
In order to function effectively and exercise their powers 
intelligently, governments today require more and more 
information and accumulate more and more records.16 Daily 
the federal government collects, with legislative approval, 
millions of personal details about the lives of American 
citizens. Much of this accumulated information about the 
attitudes, activities, and performances of individuals is found 
in case files. 
These case files often contain inaccurate information and 
infrequently, illegally obtained information. But even if the 
information was legally obtained and is true, it often may 
not provide a full and faithful portrait of an individual. 
Over time information stored in case files becomes less 
relevant to the purposes for which it was collected and often 
becomes more misleading. However, once in a case file, the 
information can, in a short period of time, attain a 
legitimacy and authority that is lacking in other less formal 
types of files.17 Like the agencies that created the files, the 
files themselves often have a life far beyond the lifespan of 
individuals who are the subjects of the files. 
part of the Constitution; or in any case ever before decided 
by this Court." 
15 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
16 James Gregory Bradsher, "A Brief History of the 
Growth of Federal Records, Archives, and Information, 
1789-1985," Government Publications Review 13 . ( 1986): 
491-505. 
17 Stanton Wheeler, "Problems and Issues in 
Record-Keeping," in Stanton Wheeler, ed., On Record: Files 
and Dossiers in American Life (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1969), 5, 23; Jerry M. Rosenberg, The Death of 
Privacy (New York: Random House, 1969), 145. 
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Although the government can legally invade privacy in 
the process of gathering information about citizens, some 
protection is afforded. The due process clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments impose requirements of proce-
dural fairness on the federal and state governments when 
they act to invade a person's privacy.ts The federal 
Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, taken 
together, set forth the conditions under which information 
impinging on privacy can be collected, used, and disseminat-
ed.19 When the federal government wrongfully invades 
privacy, an individual, acting under the due process concept 
and the Privacy Act itself, can remedy the wrongs in several 
ways, including requesting expungement- -that is, destruc-
tion of information in records or the records themselves. 
Because of the concerns about what information finds its 
way into government records, the growing computerization 
of files, and potential and actual invasions of privacy, many 
civil libertarians in the late 1960s and early 1970s called for 
a law that would allow a person to challenge the accuracy of 
information about him in a government dossier and, if the 
information was improperly obtained, provide a mechanism 
for its destruction.20 This is in keeping with the legal 
18 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); Kwong 
Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Willner v. 
Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); In 
re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968); Walker v. City of 
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956). 
19 The Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (PL 89-487) 
and the Privacy Act of 1974 (PL 93-502) are codified in 5 
u.s.c. 552. 
20 Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: 
Atheneum, 1967), 387-388; Arthur R. Miller, The Assault on 
Privacy: Computers , Data Banks, and Dossiers (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 1971), passim; Aryeh 
Neier, Dossier: The Secret Files They Keep on You (New 
York: Stein and Day, 1975), '186-199. 
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maxim that for every wrong, there should be a remedy. 
Congress, concerned about privacy, made such provisions in 
the Privacy Act of 1974. 
The Privacy Act was enacted "to promote governmental 
respect for the privacy of citizens by requiring all 
departments and agencies of the executive branch. . .to 
observe certain constitutional rules in the computerization, 
collection, management, use and disclosure of personal 
information about individuals."21 It provides that no agency 
shall maintain records describing how an individual exercises 
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment and provides that 
only such information as is relevant and necessary to 
accomplish a purpose of the agency shall be maintained. It 
also allows individuals to correct or delete improper or 
inaccurate material.22 
The Federal Records Act of 1950, as amended, provides 
the conditions under which federal records can be destroyed 
21 U. S. Cong., Senate, Protecting Individual Privacy in 
Federal Gathering, Use, and Disclosure: Report to Accompa-
ny S.3418, 93d Cong., 2d sess., S. Report 93-1138 1974, I. 
22 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(l),(7). "Each agency that maintains a 
system of records. . .shall permit the individual to request 
amendment of a record pertaining to him, and promptly, 
either make any correction of any portion thereof which the 
individual believes is not accurate, relevant, timely, or 
complete; or inform the individual of its refusal to amend 
the record in accordance with his request. ... " 5 U.S.C 
552a(d)(2); Several courts have construed the act to authorize 
expungements, as well as amendments. R.R. v. Dept. of 
Army , 482 F.Supp 770 (D.D.C. 1980); Churchwell v. United 
States, 554 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1976); White v. Civil Service 
Commission, 589 F.2d 713 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Certain types of 
records can be exempted, such as criminal law enforcement 
files. 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). 
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and establishes detailed procedures for destruction.23 It 
authorizes the archivist of the United States to determine if 
records have sufficient administrative, legal, fiscal, eviden-
tial, or informational values to warrant their continued 
retention. Under the Privacy Act agencies determine if 
records are to be expunged, notwithstanding the Federal 
Records Act. Soon after the adoption of the Privacy Act, 
questions were raised about the archivist's lack of involve-
ment in making expungement decisions. A circuit court, 
when viewing the two acts, expressly held that the Federal 
Records Act must yield to statutory or constitutional rights 
elsewhere guaranteed, stating that "this general statutory 
command [the provisions of the Federal Records Act] must 
bow to them when they are more specific, as of course it 
must bow to the Constitution."2• 
Federal courts have found that expungement of records 
is, in certain circumstances, a permissible remedy for an 
agency's violation of the Privacy Act.25 Two cases have 
expressly held this to be true when an agency violated the 
act's prohibition on maintenance of records describing an 
individual's exercise of rights guaranteed by the First 
23 44 U.S.C. 3301-3314 sets forth the procedures and 
conditions under which federal records may be destroyed or 
otherwise disposed. It ends by stating that "the procedures 
prescribed by this chapter are exclusive, and records of the 
United States Government may not be alienated or destroyed 
except under this chapter." 44 U.S.C. 3314. This is a 
contradiction to the Privacy Act expungement process. For a 
discussion of the disposition of Federal records, see James 
Gregory Bradsher, "An Administrative History of the 
Disposal of Federal Records, 1789-1949," Provenance 3 (Fall 
1985): 1-21, and "An Administrative History of the Disposal 
of Federal Records, 1950-1985," ibid. , 4 (Fall 1986): 49-63. 
24 Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d 1236 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 
1975). . 
25 Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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Amendment.26 It is equally well established that expunge-
ment of records is a proper remedy in an action brought 
under the Constitution.27 Just last year the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit observed that 
"document destruction, if feasible, is the ultimate relief 
available in a Privacy Act suit challenging the accuracy of 
agency records."28 Thus, federal records can be, have been, 
and will be expunged with complete legal approval. 
Federal archives, however, cannot be expunged. In 
drafting the Privacy Act, Congress specifically prohibited 
their destruction under the act.29 That archival material was 
exempt from almost all provisions of the Privacy Act was 
the result of three arguments that National Archives made to 
Congress. First, the National Archives argued that archives 
were not current records used to make determinations about 
individuals which could adversely affect them. Second, it 
was argued that the integrity of archives could not be 
maintained if individuals could amend them. "The fact that 
26 Clarkson v. Internal Revenue Service, 687 F.2d 1368, 
1376-1377 (11th Cir. 1982); Albright v. United States, 631 
F.2d 915, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
27 Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975); 
Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Matadure 
Corp v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
28 Melvin D. Reuber v. United States of America and 
Litton Industries, Inc., No. 84-5880, D.C. Cir. September 18, 
1987. 
29 5 U.S.C 552a(l)(3). As the House report notes, "a 
basic archival rule holds that archivists may not remove or 
amend information in any records placed m their custody. 
The principle of maintaining the integrity of records is 
considered one of the most important rules of professional 
conduct. It is important because historians quite properly 
want to learn the true condition of past government records 
when doing research; they frequently find the fact that a 
record was "inaccurate' is at least as important as the fact 
that a record was accurate." U.S. Cong., House of 
Representatives, Privacy Act of 1974: Report together with 
Additional Views to accompany H.R. 16373, 93d Cong., 2d 
sess. H. rep. 93-1416, 1974, 21. 
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records are incorrect," according to James E. O'Neill, former 
deputy archivist of the United States, "is as much a part of 
history as if they were correct."30 And, third, the National 
Archives argued that there were sufficient restrictions 
imposed by statute, the transferring agency, and the 
archivist, to protect individual privacy. 
"The foundation of our arguments," O'Neill observed in 
1976, "is the demonstrated tradition of the National Archives 
of assuming the ethical responsibility of protecting the 
privacy of individuals. It has always been a major part of 
our business," he maintained, "to balance the legitimate need 
to protect individuals from unwarranted invasions of their 
privacy against the equally legitimate demands for access to 
information. Our record in this area was a major factor in 
Congress' decision to grant the National Archives the 
exemption from the Act."31 
Because ninety-eight percent of all federal records are 
temporary in nature, their expungement, before their 
scheduled disposal date, generally poses no problem.32 
Congress, however, neglected to address the issue of 
expunging permanently scheduled records that would become 
archives. They can be destroyed. So, is there a problem 
when permanently valuable records are expunged, in whole 
or in part, before they become archives? The answer 
depends upon a variety of factors, including what informa-
tion is contained in the records, who is involved, .the 
importance of the records to posterity, and societal views on 
privacy. 
30 James E. O'Neill, "Federal Law and Access to Federal 
Records," in Hamby and Weldon, eds., Access to the Papers 
of Recent Public Figures, 41. 
31 Ibid. , 41. 
32 For a discussion of what percentage of records are 
permanent, see James Gregory Bradsher, "When One Percent 
Means A Lot: The Percentage of Permanent Records in the 
National Archives," Organiz~tion of American Historians 
Newsletter 13 (May 1985): 20-21. 
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Rather than attempting to delve deeper into the legal and 
theoretical aspects of expungements, it is more worthwhile to 
approach the subject from a personal perspective, because 
expungements involve real people. Because of the nature of 
the expungement process, there has been little written about 
it or the people who have been involved in the process.33 
But it is the human element that allows for a greater 
appreciation of the complexities involved in the expunge-
ment of permanently scheduled records. A case that allows 
insight into the process concerns Leland Stowe, a Pulitzer 
Prize winning journalist, who in 1986 donated the records 
relating to the expungement of his Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) file to the Bentley Historical Library at 
the University of Michigan. Not everything can be told 
about the Stowe expungement case, primarily because some 
of the information in his file was not made available to him, 
and, more importantly, to protect the privacy of third 
parties . However, what can be made public is illustrative of 
the problems involved in the expungement process, will 
serve as a basis to address concerns about expungements, and . 
will assist in making a decision about .whether the current 
law should be changed. 
"Once one of the most celebrated foreign correspondents 
of his time, Leland Stowe (I 899- )", it was written in a 
January 1985 Ann Arbor Observer article, "now passes 
practically unnoticed through the streets of Ann Arbor."34 
The name Leland Stowe means nothing to most Americans 
today, even in his hometown, but during the 1930s and 
1940s; he was among the most successful and most admired 
33 For an account of one person's excursion through the 
expungement process, see Penn Kimball, The File (New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983) and Penn T. 
Kimball v. Department of State, Civil Action No. 84-3795, 
U.S.D.C. Southern District of New York. 
34 Raymond Stock, "The Extraordinary Career of Leland 
Stowe," Ann Arbor Observer, (January 1985): 37-45. 
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foreign correspondents.ss Working for the New York Herald 
Tribune, Stowe covered the League of Nations between 1927 
and 1931 and the end of the Spanish dictatorship and 
founding of the Spanish Republic from 1929 to 1931. For 
his 1929 coverage of the Paris Reparations Commission, he 
received the Pulitzer Prize. In 1933 he covered the 
Reichstag fire trial in Berlin and published his first book, 
Nazi Germany Means War. Returning from Europe in 1935, 
he became a roving Western Hemisphere correspondent and 
then returned to Spain on leave of absence in 193 7, and 
again in 1938, to cover the plight of the homeless and 
orphans from the Spanish Civil War. 
In September 1939 Stowe joined the Chicago Daily News 
and went to Finland in December when that country was 
invaded by Russia. The following year he covered the 
German takeover of Norway and wrote a book about it, No 
Other Road to Freedom. In 1942 he became the first western 
correspondent to spend time with Russian combat forces. 
During the war he spent thirty-four months overseas 
traveling with the armies of seven different nations, 
reporting in forty-four countries and colonies on four 
continents, and in the process became one of the premier 
war reporters of the era. By the end of the war, he had won 
virtually every major award for foreign reporting and 
received honorary degrees from three universities, including 
Harvard. 
Returning to the United States in 1944, Stowe published 
another war book, They Shall Not Sleep, became a 
correspondent for the American Broadcasting Corporation 
radio network, and wrote for the New York Post syndicate. 
He also did commentary for the Mutual Broadcasting System. 
In 1946 he published While Time Remains, condemning the 
35 Biographical information on Stowe came from a draft 
copy of "Leland Stowe," an entry prepared by Jack 
Schnedler, The Dictionary of Literary Biography, and Stock, 
"The Extraordinary Career of Leland Stowe," Ann Arbor 
Observer, 37-45. 
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decision to use the atomic bomb against civilians and calling 
for world cooperation, even world government, to control 
nuclear weapons. In 1949, he warned in Target You of 
Soviet territorial ambitions and discussed them again in his 
1952 Conquest by Terror: The Story of Satellite Europe. 
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, Stowe held a 
variety of positions, including director of Radio Free 
Europe's News and Information Service (1952-1954). In 
1955 he began a twenty-one year part-time career as a 
roving editor for Reader's Digest, and the following year 
began a fourteen year tenure as a professor of journalism at 
the University of Michigan. He continued writing books, 
publishing his eighth in 1984. 
In 1979, while assembling his papers for donation to the 
Mass Communications History Center in Madison, Wisconsin, 
Stowe wrote the FBI, under the FOIA, for information 
relating to himself. He believed, because of the views he 
had expressed during the Spanish Civil War, that he must 
have been investigated.36 He was eventually supplied with 
116 pages of materials, most of it from an internal security 
investigative case file. The file covered thirty years, 
beginning in 1943 with an internal security investigation of 
Stowe's activities on the Eastern Front and ending in March 
1972 with documents relating to his unsuccessful attempt to 
interview J. Edgar Hoover for a favorable piece on the FBI 
Laboratory that he was writing for the Reader's Digest. 
These latter documents indicate he was refused an 
interview with Hoover because of derogatory information in 
the files. That is, he was considered not worthy to see 
Hoover. What was this derogatory information? The docu-
ments Stowe obtained revealed that he had been the subject 
of an internal security investigation because "he was 
36 Stowe's typewritten chronology of his dealings with 
the FBI, 6 December 1982, in Leland Stowe Papers, 
Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, 
University of Michigan, I. Hereafter cited as Stowe Papers. 
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associated with communist front groups and activities in the 
World War II period, and also expressed sympathy and 
support toward the Soviet Union." Additionally, the file 
indicated that during a radio broadcast in August 1947, 
while discussing the Federal Employees Loyalty Program, 
Stowe "made statements implying improper actions on the 
part of the FBI." His comments prompted Hoover to write a 
letter of protest to the Mutual Broadcasting Company.37 
The release of the file was quite enlightening to Stowe. 
He had not been aware the FBI had been monitoring his 
activities and personal communications.38 He believed that 
the file was riddled with factual errors and misrepresenta-
tions, and he was disturbed that the file represented him as a 
person of uncertain loyalty to the American government, of 
being unduly admiring of the accomplishments of the Soviet 
government, and as being an associate of others of similar 
disposition. The allegations in the file, Stowe realized, had 
been disseminated and had a negative impact on his life. He 
believed that what he once considered unrelated setbacks in 
his professional life in the 1940s and l 950s--loss of a series 
of lucrative speaking engagements and a failure to obtain a 
routine security clearance to continue a job with Radio Free 
Europe--were the result of the distribution of this 
derogatory information about him.39 
Believing that the "true" story should be told, Stowe 
attempted to have the FBI amend his file. On 30 .August 
1980 he sent the FBI over seven hundred pages of documents 
giving his version of events. A month later the FBI 
informed Stowe that certain information maintained in their 
37 Copy of FBI memo (FBI file l 00-192690-31) from M. 
A. Jones to Mr. Bishop, February 27, 1972, Stowe Papers. 
38 Michael V. Smith, "The Problem of Determining 
Motives in FBI Surveillance of Journalists and the Case of 
Leland Stowe," a paper prepared at the University of 
Michigan's Department of Communication, [1984], 6, 7, 16 
n. 11. Stowe Papers. 
39 Ibid ., 8. 
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files was exempt from the correction and amendment 
provisions of the Privacy Act, but that it was their policy to 
consider each request on an individual basis in order to 
reach an equitable determination consistent with the best 
interests of both the individual and the government. As for 
his documents, Stowe was told that the information 
contained in his file was "an accurate recording of what was 
furnished to us by several sources, and is completely relevant 
to the purpose for which it was collected." However, he was 
informed that "in view of the age and nature of this material 
its continued retention is unnecessary, and could be 
destroyed in its entirety." Stowe was told that if he wanted 
the file destroyed he would have to ask that it be done:to 
Stowe wrote the FBI on 6 November 1980 to ascertain 
what would be destroyed. The FBI responded two weeks 
later, informing him that the destruction of FBI records 
concerning him would include index cards, one investigative · 
file of which he was the subject, and all references in other 
files identifiable with him.41 Although he "felt a certain 
obligation to preserve what might be considered an 
important historical record," he "believed it likely that the 
data might contribute to a future history that would be 
insensitive to the FBl's distortions and to the lives of those 
who--like himself--had been unknowing and essentially 
innocent victims of the agency." Unless the file could be 
amended, "Stowe believed the future would be served better 
by the file's destruction than by its preservation."42 On 24 
November 1980, Stowe wrote the FBI approving the 
destruction. 43 
40 Thomas H. Bresson to Leland Stowe, 30 September 
1980, Stowe Papers. 
41 Thomas H. Bresson to Leland Stowe, 19 November 
1980, ibid. 
42 Smith, "The Problem of Determining Motives in FBI 
Surveillance of Journalists and the Case of Leland Stowe," 9. 
43 Leland Stowe to Thomas H. Bresson, 24 November 
1980, Stowe Papers. 
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Because the complete file was to be expunged, the FBI, 
acting under National Archives regulations, requested that 
the National Archives document that the records would be 
destroyed.•• Several National Archives appraisers looked at 
the file during the winter of 1981-1982. Most of them 
believed the file should not be destroyed. Acting on their 
advice, James E. O'Neill, then assistant archivist for 
presidential libraries and director of the National Archives 
Records Appraisal Task Force, wrote Stowe in hopes of 
discouraging him from his disposal request. Stowe was told 
that "the destruction of this case file would create an 
enormous gap in the historical record of the FBI. Your 
professional career," O'Neill wrote, "would be of considerable 
interest to anyone doing a study of 20th century American 
journalism, the molding of American public opinion during 
WWII and the early Cold War era, and how the government 
monitored dissent during the 1940s." Stowe was informed 
that if he withdrew his disposal request the file would not be 
opened to the public until the year 2022, fifty years after 
the case file was closed.45 
"In its present state," Stowe wrote O'Neill, "my case file 
is inevitably one-sided; perhaps, in some degree unavoidably 
so--but much more so because of the Bureau agents' 
acceptance of charges made against me without any recorded 
effort to check up on their validity or veracity." Stowe 
wrote that in the file he had found numerous unverified 
allegations of his being "a Red, a Communist or pro-Soviet 
44 The National Archives regulations are set forth in 
GSA Bulletin FPMR B-74 Archives and Records, Subject: 
Disposal of Federal records in response to requests made 
pursuant to the Privacy Act, 17 January 1978. These 
regulations allow federal agencies to expunge up to 99.9 
percent of any record without National Archives involve-
ment. If complete destruction is requested, agencies must 
involve the National Archives in the process, so the 
destruction can be documented. 
45 James E. O'Neill to Leland Stowe, 11 March 1982, 
Stowe Papers. 
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fellow-traveler" and "also many easily disprovable reports 
and interpretations concerning my journalistic writings and 
ideological attitudes. These discrepancies," he wrote, "are 
especially noteworthy because the agents' reports were totally 
lacking any counter-balancing or refutory facts--readily 
available at the time--about my professional and public 
career." His file, he believed, was "demonstrably dis-
tortive--frequently extremely so--of my journalistic record 
and all factual evidence of my dedication to democratic 
principles and my lifelong loyalty to our American form of 
government is omitted." 
Therefore, Stowe continued, if his file was to be 
preserved for historical purposes, "I firmly believe that my 
own counter-balancing documents should be included. 
Elemental justice," he believed, "would make such inclusion 
a prerequisite, and historically indispensable. Should NARS 
[National Archives and Records Service] wish to preserve 
these documents--together with my FBI file for future 
historical reference--! would welcome having the combined 
materials ultimately become available, among the Archives' 
important and most useful collections--even if not until the 
year 2022 AD." If the National Archives would not do this, 
he wanted his file destroyed.•6 
During the summer of 1982, the National Archives 
informed Stowe that he could not attach material to his file 
when it was accessioned. Thus, he desired his file to be 
destroyed. The next summer the archivist of the United 
States "approved" the file's destruction.•7 
46 Leland Stowe to James E. O'Neill, 29 March 1982, 
ibid. 
47 Early in 1986, Stowe was informed the FBI was 
processing his request and that the file would be destroyed 
in the near future and that he would be notified when the 
expungement was completed. James E. O'Neill to Leland 
Stowe, 27 February 1986, ibid. 
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Stowe's case is an excellent example of the dilemma 
faced by those dealing with the right to know, the right to 
privacy, and the expungement process. What was lost and 
gained in the destruction of his file? Stowe gained the 
satisfaction of knowing that what he believed was a file full 
of false allegations, errors of fact and interpretation, and 
misrepresentations, was destroyed. His reputation, and his 
privacy, will be protected. It could be argued that nothing 
was lost by the destruction. After all, other FBI files will 
reveal its internal security activities--legal and illegal. With 
respect to Stowe, jf someone was interested in him and his 
encounter with the FBI, they could obtain information 
elsewhere. Stowe himself did not think his case file 
particularly important, writing the National Archives that 
until it contacted him, he considered "its value seemingly 
very slight."48 
Three things were lost by the destruction of Stowe's file. 
First was unique information about Stowe. Second was 
evidence of an FBI investigation of a prominent journalist. 
And third was evidence, along with his own papers, to show 
the impact of the FBI on his life. Had Stowe received a 
security clearance he might have assumed an even higher 
position with Radio Free Europe, and thus, the last 
thirty-five years of his life might have been very different. 
The right to know was sacrificed to Leland Stowe's right 
to privacy. Should it have been? In the process of 
protecting privacy should the eventual right to know be 
sacrificed? Should the FBI have been allowed to destroy the 
Stowe case file? The Stowe case is not an isolated example. 
Inaccurate or illegally obtained information, of varying 
importance, contained in permanently scheduled records, is 
being destroyed to protect privacy rights on a continuing 
basis. In most instances, no great harm results from such 
expungements. In part, this is because of the nature of the 
48 Leland Stowe to James E. O'Neill, 29 March 1982, 
ibid. 
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information; in part, it is because of the belief that great 
weight should be given to privacy, since it is basically, if not 
legally, a natural right and not so easily given up to society 
without exceptional cause.49 In most instances, the right to 
know is not an exceptional cause, either today or for the 
sake of history, but there are exceptions. 
During the Nixon administration, the White House had 
the FBI illegally wiretap seventeen American citizens that it 
believed were responsible for leaks. Subsequently, the public 
learned of these wiretaps, and Congress held hearings about 
them.so Some of those who were wiretapped wanted the 
related records made public, while others wanted to keep the 
contents of the files private, and one person wanted his file 
expunged. What if all seventeen individuals had asked to 
have their wiretap files expunged, based on the fact that 
they should not have been wiretapped? If the files were 
destroyed to protect their privacy and to right a government 
wrong, will history know? The answer is no. If there is no 
record of the misdeed, then for all practical purposes it did 
not happen. Is this what archivists and historians want? 
49 On privacy as a natural right, see Bernard Schwartz, 
A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. Part 
III. Rights of the Person (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1968), 169-258; Louis Brandeis and Samuel D. 
Warren, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (15 
December 1890): 193-220; Charles Grove Haines, The 
Revival of Natural Law Concepts (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1930), 85; Henry Steele Commager, 
"Constitutional History and the Higher Law," in The 
Constitution Reconsidered, edited for the American Historical 
Association by Conyers Read, revised edition with a new 
preface by Richard B. Morris (New York: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1968), 230, 232. 
50 David Wise, The American Police State: The Govern-
ment Against the People (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), 
31-95. 
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The answers to the above questions lie, for the most 
part, in how the right of privacy is viewed in relation to the 
right to know--the desire of historians and others to have 
raw data on which to base their judgments of events, 
activities, and people. On one hand privacy is an important 
right, not so easily sacrificed without good reason and with 
due process. Yet, there are instances when it is necessary to 
know now as well as in the future when an individual's 
privacy must be sacrificed for the greater good of society. 
For example, if records document individual or a pattern of 
government abuses and nobody knows, no action can be 
taken to correct the situation. With information available to 
it, society can, through one or more branches of government, 
mandate changes. 
Under current expungement procedures, historically 
valuable information is legally destroyed. Professional 
archival judgments carry no weight in the process o.f 
balancing privacy with the right to know, because under the 
law the decision whether or not to expunge does not lie with 
archivists, but with the individuals and agencies involved. 
Thus, there is a need to change the way expungements are 
handled if permanently scheduled records of exceptional 
value are to be preserved and eventually made available for 
research. 
The easiest solution, though perhaps not the best, would 
be to have Congress change the Federal Records Act to 
provide that once records have been appraised as having 
enduring value, they be considered archival, and thus not 
subject to expungement. This, of course, would mean a 
change in the United States' definition of archives, much 
along the lines of the French Archival Law of 1979 that 
provides that permanently valuable records become archives 
the minute they are created or received.SI 
51 Michael Duchein, "Archives in France: The New 
Legislation of 1979," Archivaria, 11 (Winter 1980-81 ): 128. 
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If there is to be a change, it must be made within a 
workable formula which encompasses, balances, and appro-
priately protects all interests. The "determination of the 
propriety of an order directing expungement;" according to a 
circuit court, "involves a balancing of interests; the harm 
caused to an individual by the existence of any record must 
be weighed against the utility to the Government of their 
maintenance."52 The court was thinking in terms of current 
administrative usefulness to the government, not future uses 
in terms of informational and evidential values. As the 
expungement process now works, federal agencies, in 
approving expungement requests, are protecting the interests 
of privacy, but not the interests of those who want to know. 
Assuming that in some instances the right to know takes 
precedence over the right to privacy, who should be 
responsible for making the decision--the choice between 
retention and destruction? Federal agency personnel should 
be excluded for the same reason they are excluded from 
having the final say on appraisal judgments--because they 
are, for the most part, not as experienced or as well trained 
as federal archivists in judging the archival value of records. 
If federal agencies are eliminated, three choices remain: the 
legislature, the courts, and archivists. 
Congress, although responsible for amending the Privacy 
Act, cannot directly involve itself in the expungement 
process. "The conflict between the general public's right to 
know what its government is doing and the individual's right 
to have some control over the dissemination of personal 
information held by the government is an extremely difficult 
one to resolve" according to one legal scholar. "And it is 
doubtful," he adds, "that any legislative formula could off er 
more than general guidelines for handling the kaleidoscopic 
factual problems that are certain to arise."53 This was 
written four years before Congress enacted the Privacy Act. 
52 Paton v. La Pradae, 524 F. 2d 868 (3d Cir. 1975). 
53 Miller, The Assault on Privacy, 153-154. 
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It encompasses a great deal of truth. There are so many 
situations that Congress could not adopt legislation covering 
every specific situation. Thus, realistically, Congress can 
only amend the act to provide some general guidelines 
covering expungements of permanently scheduled records. 
If the Privacy Act is amended, it should provide that 
agencies must have the approval of the National Archives 
before any portion of permanently scheduled or as yet 
unscheduled records are destroyed under an expungement 
request. Such a provision would be based on the premise 
that archivists are better qualified than agency officials to 
determine the historical value of records and are adequately 
trained to balance privacy and the right to know. If the 
National Archives believes that records should not ·be 
expunged, in whole or part, the involved citizen should be 
informed and given the opportunity to appeal the decision, 
or possibly to suggest a partial expungement, such as name 
and other personal identifiers, or to agree to keeping the file 
closed for an appropriate length of time. The person could 
be given the opportunity to amend the record, within reason, 
and the record would either be opened at its normal time or 
after an extended period of time, or the individual could be 
allowed to attach a statement indicating where countervailing 
evidence is located.5• These options are in keeping with a 
federal court's finding that expungement is a "versatile tool" 
where "expungement of only some records, from some 
Government files, may be enough, as may the placing of 
restrictions on how the information contained in tbe records 
may be used. It is a tool which must be applied with close 
attention to the peculiar facts in each case."55 If a 
compromise cannot be reached by both parties, then the 
decision should be rendered by the courts. 
54 For a brief discussion of a person's ability to dispute 
information, see Regina C. McGranery, "A Donor's View," in 
Hamby and Weldon, eds., Access to the Papers of Recent 
Public Figures, 54-56. 
SS Chastain v. Kelley , 510 'F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
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Courts frequently have been called upon to determine 
whether privacy exists as a legal right and, if so, then to 
what extent and under what conditions. Constitutional rights 
of free speech, press, and assembly are often set up in 
opposition to privacy rights and the courts called upon to 
strike a delicate and often difficult balance between privacy 
concerns, on the one hand, and constitutionally protected 
interests in free expression, on the other.56 Expungement 
cases could be handled by the courts through two methods. 
The first would be to let the courts review the documenta-
tion and render a decision. If the decision was unsatisfacto-
ry to either the National Archives or the individual, then a 
court hearing could be held, and its decision appealed to a 
higher court if necessary. 
Privacy expungements involve complex and subtle issues. 
They are issues on which archivists can disagree, both as to 
whether the right to know or the right to privacy should be 
given greater weight and as to what records are of such 
importance that they are worthy of being preserved, despite 
being the subject of a legitimate expungement request. As 
the federal expungement process now works, archivists have 
no influence in the process. The decision to expunge 
permanently scheduled records completely--just one step 
removed from being archives--is left in the hands of the 
agencies and their officials who have custody of the records. 
These officials, in most instances, do not mind destroying 
records--not only to protect the rights of citizens but also to 
protect their agency from lawsuits for having certain 
information and not destroying it. 
56 Adam Carlyle Breckenridge, The Right to Privacy 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), Chapter 3, 
"Rights in Conflict," 55-82; Paul Bender, "Privacy," in 
Norman Dorsen, ed., Our Endangered Rights: The ACLU 
Report on Civil Liberties Today (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1984), 237-258. 
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Under the current expungement process not only is 
history shortchanged, but the present society's ability to 
know fully what its government is doing to its citizens is 
also. Thus, there is a need to change the current process, to 
amend the Privacy Act along the lines outlined earlier. By 
doing so, by bringing archivists into the process, a balance 
can be struck between the right to know and the right to 
privacy. Neither is an absolute, especially when placed in 
opposition to the other. But while gaining a greater role in 
the expungement process, archivists should remember that 
while the right to know, not only today but also tomorrow, 
is a political right that is very important to a democratic 
form of government, the right to privacy is certainly one 
that should not be sacrificed without exceptional cause. 
James Gregory Bradsher is an archivist at the National 
Archives and Records Administration. The views expressed in this 
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